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Abstract
We report the results of a cross-cultural investigation of person-body reasoning in the United
Kingdom and northern Brazilian Amazon (Marajó Island). The study provides evidence that directly
bears upon divergent theoretical claims in cognitive psychology and anthropology, respectively, on
the cognitive origins and cross-cultural incidence of mind-body dualism. In a novel reasoning task,
we found that participants across the two sample populations parsed a wide range of capacities
similarly in terms of the capacities’ perceived anchoring to bodily function. Patterns of reasoning
concerning the respective roles of physical and biological properties in sustaining various capacities
did vary between sample populations, however. Further, the data challenge prior ad-hoc categor-
izations in the empirical literature on the developmental origins of and cognitive constraints
on psycho-physical reasoning (e.g., in afterlife concepts). We suggest cross-culturally validated
categories of ‘‘Body Dependent’’ and ‘‘Body Independent’’ items for future developmental and
cross-cultural research in this emerging area.
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1. Introduction
Recently, there has been growing interest among cognitive psychologists and socio-
cultural anthropologists in the developmental origins and cross-cultural incidence of
mind-body dualism (e.g., Bloom, 2004; Cohen, 2008; Hodge, 2008; Wellman & Johnson,
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2008). Some developmental psychologists have hypothesized that the autonomy of
cognitive systems dealing with the social and physical worlds renders naı̈ve, or intuitive,
psycho-physical dualism a default cognitive stance in reasoning about human and human-
like agents (Bloom, 2004; Wellman & Johnson, 2008; Wynn, 2008). Two main strands of
inquiry bear upon this position.
The first strand investigates children’s and adults’ reasoning about phenomena that entail
interactions across physical ⁄biological and psychological domains (e.g., psychogenic bodily
events). Evidence suggests that reasoning about cross-domain psycho-physical interactions
presents conceptual challenges (e.g., Hatano & Inagaki, 1994; Inagaki & Hatano, 1993;
Notaro, Gelman, & Zimmerman, 2001, 2002; Schultz, Bonawitz, & Griffiths, 2007). North
American children, for instance, had difficulty appreciating the possibility of worry-induced
stomach ache or fear-induced goosebumps (Notaro et al., 2001, 2002). Some researchers
have suggested that the domain distinction that enables children to distinguish appropriately
between mental events and their physical counterparts (e.g., a thought about a house is
different from an actual house; wanting to get taller is different from actually getting
taller) constrains reasoning about phenomena that entail causal interactions across domains
(Wellman & Johnson, 2008).
Further research has shown that under certain conditions, such as when evidence of
cross-domain causes and effects are presented (e.g., a fear-induced tummy ache), 4 and
5 year olds (but not younger children) can entertain this as a causal possibility, even though
it conflicts with their prior beliefs about domain-appropriate causes (Schultz et al., 2007).
Despite developmental changes, however, there is some evidence to suggest that a bias
toward within-domain causal attribution is not easily revised or overridden. Although adults
display little difficulty in reflectively appreciating the possibility of cross-domain inter-
actions (as demonstrated in some of the above studies), recent studies among clinical profes-
sionals have shown a tendency to dichotomize mental and biological causes and cures when
reasoning about clinical phenomena (Ahn, Proctor, & Flanagan, 2009; Miresco & Kirmayer,
2006). Furthermore, participants differentially attributed responsibility for illness-related
behaviors depending on whether they subjectively evaluated the illness as having a psycho-
logical or biological etiology (Miresco & Kirmayer, 2006). This bias appears to persist
alongside the contrary, dominant mind-body integrative position that characterizes modern
medical science and professional training, suggesting divergence between explicit and
implicit theories. One discussion concludes that ‘‘similarities between expert clinicians and
laypeople could reflect deep-seated inclinations to separate biology from psychology’’ (Ahn
et al., 2009, p. 172).
The second strand of relevant research investigates reasoning about phenomena that
entail the conceptual unbuckling of mind and body. Recently, several studies have investi-
gated children’s understandings of biological death and, in particular, their expectations
about the post-death continuity or discontinuity of mental states (Astuti & Harris, 2008;
Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Bering, Hernández Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2005; Harris &
Giménez, 2005). Research with American children suggests a developmental trend that is
contingent upon developing understandings of interactions between psychological and
biological domains. Specifically, the age-related decrease in children’s tendency to judge
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psychological traits as continuing following death (continuity judgements) is attributed to
children’s developing knowledge of biological function and its supporting role in psycho-
logical function (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004).
Bering and Bjorklund (2004) argue that, as biological knowledge develops, the newly
acquired appreciation that mental capacities are contingent upon biological function is
applied to reasoning about the mental capacities of dead agents. Finer-grained analysis of
different categories of mental state—distinguished according to the degree to which states
‘‘conceptually at least, appear planted in the body’’ (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004, p. 218)—
further supports this interpretation of children’s reasoning patterns. Compared with
questions about psychobiological states, for example, questions concerning epistemic
mental states (e.g., knowing, remembering) were more likely to elicit continuity judgements
among late elementary children and adults.
Cross-cultural research in Spain and Madagascar has shown that response patterns are
influenced by the ways in which narratives about death are framed (Astuti & Harris, 2008;
Harris & Giménez, 2005). For example, when death is described in a biomedical context,
such as in a hospital, continuity judgements are elicited less frequently than when death is
described in the context of funerary rituals that imply the continuity of the person in some
form. Although the research programs investigating the development of afterlife concepts
are methodologically divergent (e.g., in age-groups investigated, questionnaire composition,
response options, and coding practices), and therefore offer results of limited comparability,
together they suggest that concepts that entail psychological continuity following biological
death are readily acquired and used. Such concepts do not appear to encounter the kind of
cognitive impediment apparent in reasoning about cross-domain psycho-physical ⁄biological
interactions.
Some recent research with infants has sought to investigate more directly the develop-
mental origins of this facility to reason about the autonomy of mental phenomena from bod-
ily function. Kuhlmeier, Bloom, and Wynn (2004a) present controversial but suggestive
findings that 5-month-old infants do not apply the principle of continuous motion to
humans, suggesting that ‘‘infants do not readily view humans as material objects’’ (p. 101)
and that humans’ agentive properties are so salient to the infant participants as to eclipse the
presence of their physical properties (see also Kuhlmeier, Bloom, & Wynn, 2004b; Rakison
& Cicchino, 2004; Saxe, Tzelnic, & Carey, 2006; Wynn, 2008).
Although there is still limited experimental data bearing directly on the question of
whether, at least for some mental and bodily events under some conditions, mind-body
autonomy is a default intuitive stance, these findings jointly suggest that: (a) the capacity to
distinguish between psychological and physical causation emerges early in development,
and concepts that entail a conceptual distinction between these two domains are readily
acquired and used; (b) this receptiveness to dualism may be attributable to an early develop-
ing discrimination between mental and physical events that constrains children’s reasoning
about psychogenic bodily events and illnesses in cases where it is both appropriate and inap-
propriate to do so; (c) this bias persists, at least for some domains and under some condi-
tions, into adulthood—widespread concepts of death, illness, invisible companions,
supernatural entities, and brain, mind, and identity, also appear to be underpinned by the
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capacity readily to conceive of persons and their bodies as separable (e.g., Cohen, 2008;
Cohen & Barrett, 2008a,b).
Ethnographic data on the cross-cultural recurrence of dualistic concepts of afterlife,
deities, spirit possession, reincarnation, illness, and so on are frequently drawn upon to
support the claim that psycho-physical dualism is pervasive in reasoning about agents and
things (e.g., Bloom, 2004; Cohen, 2008). Yet psychological and anthropological research
programs have proceeded along divergent trajectories, arriving at incommensurable
theoretical positions. Despite the huge scope for theoretical and methodological cross-
fertilization, interdisciplinary dialog and debate has been slow to develop (but see Astuti,
2001).
Anthropologists, on the whole, no longer dispute the claim that the dualistic separation of
mind from body is a historical and cultural construction. According to this view, mind-body
dualism is culturally localized, rooted in a particularly influential philosophy—namely
Cartesianism—and is ‘‘but one among many systems of knowledge regarding relations held
to obtain between mind [and] body’’ (Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1987, p. 11), and ‘‘many (if
not most) non-Western people … simply do not recognize anything comparable to the
social ⁄biological distinction as articulated in western discourse’’ (Ingold, 1991, p. 362; see
also Strathern, 1996; Lambek, 1998).
Ethnographic evidence brought to bear on these claims is often difficult to interpret, how-
ever. Empirical claims and data are frequently couched in abstruse metaphorical language
(e.g., ‘‘Gahuku notions do not parallel, but collapse, western mind ⁄body categories. For
them … the body swallows and contains the mind, and also becomes itself the mark of the
person’’ [Strathern, 1994, p. 45]). Sources of evidence, and their quality and representative-
ness, are also frequently obscure. Nevertheless, relevant data suggest considerable cross-
cultural variability in the ways in which ‘‘mind’’ and ‘‘body’’ and interactions between them
are construed. The Cashinahua of the Peruvian and Brazilian Amazon, for example, construe
knowledge as ‘‘an intimate part of each developing body’’ (McCallum, 1996, p. 355) and
certain organs, such as the skin, hands, ears, genitals, liver, and eyes, are believed to be
linked to processes of learning in a physical sense. Skin knowledge, for example, is said to
be actually attached to the skin. Disturbances in bodily function can thus have ‘‘dire conse-
quences’’ for knowledge (ibid, p. 347). Such ideas about mind-body interdependencies are
not dissimilar to Western understandings that brain function and impairment cause psycho-
logical disturbances or the view that heart and liver transplants, for example, can result in the
transference of aspects of the donor’s psychological character to the recipent.1
The ethnographic literature further presents widespread examples of psychogenic physi-
cal illness, and of instances in which one’s illness is not caused by one’s own thoughts but
rather the thoughts of others. For example, in many parts of Melanesia, thoughts, actions,
and attitudes of living and dead kinsfolk are believed to influence a person’s health (e.g.,
Frankel, 1986; Lewis, 2004). Similarly, across Lowland South America, many people rea-
son that biological ties between persons are not exclusively forged via biological kinship
(e.g., Vilaça, 2002). The Huaorani of Ecuador, for example, affirm that people living in the
same longhouse gradually become of the same substance—as they say, ‘‘of one same
flesh.’’ (Rival, 1998, p. 621) The physical reality of living together, that is, of continuously
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feeding each other, eating the same food, and sleeping together, develops into a common
biological constitution, which is ‘‘far more real’’ than geneaological ties (ibid.). While none
of these examples supports the strong claim that non-Western populations are free of dualis-
tic concepts and reasoning, they—and many others—point to considerable cross-cultural
variability in the ways in which people conceptualize possible interactions between social,
psychological, biological, and physical domains in the construction and constitution of the
person.
The overall picture emerging from anthropological and psychological research suggests
that there may be some aspects of experience about which people may readily reason in
terms of the autonomy of mental and bodily domains, and some aspects about which people
readily reason in terms of the interdependencies of mental and bodily domains. There is
surprisingly little systematic cross-cultural and interdisciplinary research on these issues,
however. Many questions remain as to where any strong intuitions and cognitive constraints
lie, their origins and development, the conditions under which they are activated, and how
they shape cultural expression and transmission. Systematic, cross-cultural data are needed
to test claims about the cultural uniqueness of so-called Western mind-body dualism.
Cognitive psychological research is required to investigate the ways in which cognitive
function in these domains constrains and informs cultural uniformity and diversity.
In this paper, we present evidence that begins to address these questions and evidential
gaps. We investigated and compared person-body reasoning in two culturally distinct
populations, one in the United Kingdom and one in the northern Brazilian Amazon. Our aim
was not to establish whether dualistic reasoning (or, perhaps more relevantly, biological–
physical–psychological ‘‘trialism’’) is a default mode of reasoning. Rather we set out to
explore whether the two populations exhibit any common intuitions about the relationships
between certain traits and bodily properties. More specifically, using a novel interview task,
we investigated reasoning about a broad range of basic psychological capacities and apti-
tudes and their perceived anchoring to the body, and specifically to physical and biological
properties. The fundamental question was, ‘‘What do people intuitively consider to be left
of themselves once they have been stripped of their bodies?’’ Participants reasoned about
novel and hypothetical mind-body phenomena, such that any reflective theory they may
have held about mind-body phenomena in general would provide little recourse for the
generation of relevant inferences and judgements.
This exploratory investigation was carried out in Oxford, UK, and in the province of São
Sebastião da Boa Vista, Marajó Island, northern Brazil. A brief demographic and
ethnographic portrait of the Brazilian research site is given in the next section.
The study had three between-subjects conditions. Condition 1 investigated the contours
of people’s ‘‘disembodied person’’ concept. Participants were asked to imagine they have
left their body and to offer judgements about the likely continuity or discontinuity of a range
of capacities (e.g., seeing, knowing, feeling happy, etc.). By encouraging participants to
reason about disembodied existence as though it were a literal possibility, we aimed to
probe beneath explicit beliefs to implicit intuitions. Though participants may believe such
an extraction from one’s body to be impossible, this protocol would, nevertheless, reveal
any converging intuitions regarding what particular capacities would or would not continue
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provided such a disembodiment were possible. If participants find such a body-person
divorce difficult or impossible to contemplate even as a hypothetical scenario, we would not
expect converging intuitions about which traits would or would not continue, but random or
arbitrary answering. Convergent responses potentially suggest convergent intuitions, pro-
vided that participants have understood the task. Further, if person-body reasoning is wholly
derived from socially transmitted culture, and mind-body dualism is a uniquely Cartesian
heritage of Western populations, we would expect to see considerable divergence between
any response patterns of the two sample populations.
In Conditions 2 and 3, participants were asked to imagine they have left their body
and have entered a rock (C2) or plant (C3). Comparison of response patterns across con-
ditions allowed us to investigate the relative importance of physical and biological prop-
erties in judgements about the continuity of various capacities. It seems likely that
intuitions about bodily and mental phenomena are guided by a range of cognitive mecha-
nisms, most fundamentally those having to do with psychology, physicality, and biology.
The present study addresses the two-part question: (a) (how) does adding the property of
physicality alter patterns of responses for certain items? and (b) does physicality alone
alter response patterns, or does the presence of biological properties also influence
people’s judgements about the continuity of certain psychological capacities? Perhaps
some psychological capacities are regarded as requiring a physical body whereas others
require a biological, physical body. This method potentially allows identification of those
traits considered to be anchored to greater or lesser degrees to physical, biological, or
psychological function, or some combination of these properties. For the purposes of this
initial investigation, ‘‘rock’’ was used as the target bounded physical object because
rocks are familiar to both sample populations, and, as a natural objects, they do not
import additional confounding properties that may be activated by artefacts (e.g., as
intentionally crafted, and owned or associated with a particular person, or kind of
person). ‘‘Plant’’ was selected as a relevant entity for the biological condition for its
matched everyday familiarity with ‘‘rock’’ (used in the physical condition), and was
chosen over ‘‘non-human animal’’ in order to avoid confounds that would potentially
arise from the activation of intuitions about animal psychology.
Comparing results from all conditions cross-culturally, we aimed to explore regulari-
ties and differences across the patterns of responses between the UK and the Brazilian
Amazon populations. The majority of participants in the Brazilian Amazonian community
have had only minimal (1–3 years) or no formal schooling. Intuitive and reflective beliefs
relevant to our interview task would have been almost exclusively honed through dis-
course about and direct experience of sickness and cure, for example, and of the natural
biological and physical world of the river and forest within and from which they live. In
contrast, UK participants have received scientific education in physics and biology
(including biomedicine), and, against a traditional Cartesian cultural backdrop, increased
exposure via popular neuroscience and neurology to the science of the brain and the
brain-mind interface. Differences in formal and informal education about, and direct
engagement with, divergent natural physical and biological environments may establish
different intuitions about the respective roles of physicality and biology in sustaining
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various traits. Alternatively, fundamental regularities in participants’ physical and bio-
logical environments and person-body experiences may sustain fairly uniform patterns of
reasoning between populations about persons and bodies across the experimental
conditions, with divergences in education, environment, and cultural tradition having
little impact on intuitive expectations in this domain.
Finally, analyzing results from the Disembodied condition, we also sought to establish
validated categories of ‘‘body dependent’’ and ‘‘body independent’’ states. Recent research
on children’s developing conceptions of psychological continuity after death has used
categories (e.g., ‘‘epistemic,’’ ‘‘emotional,’’ ‘‘perceptual,’’ ‘‘psychobiological,’’ etc.)
established according to predetermined assumptions about the degree to which the
experimenters perceived psychological capacities, such as feeling hungry, remembering,
seeing, etc., to be tied to biological function (e.g., Astuti & Harris, 2008; Bering &
Bjorklund, 2004). The current study enabled assessment of the validity of these categories
and the tentative establishment of cross-culturally validated categories for future research
on ‘‘bodily’’ and ‘‘mental’’ capacities.
After a brief introduction to the Brazilian research setting, and description of the study
design and participants, we present results and discussions in two blocks. First, we present
and discuss the cross-cultural and cross-condition findings. We then assess the validity of
trait categories used previously in the literature and suggest new categories for future
research based on our findings. We finish with a general concluding discussion.
2. Brazil research site: Marajo Island
Marajó, meaning ‘‘barrier to the ocean,’’ is a large archipelago (40,000 km2) at the
Amazon River delta. The municipality of São Sebastião da Boa Vista (SSBV) is located
at the south of the archipelago, just to the west of the confluence of the Pará and
Tocantins Rivers. There is no published ethnographic research on this specific Brazilian
community, but one of us (Cohen) has been conducting research in the broader region
since 2002 (e.g., Cohen, 2007), including ‘‘interior’’ (or rural) regions of Pará and neigh-
boring communities on Marajó Island. The research reported here was conducted during
July–September 2008. A female assistant from Belém and anthropology graduate, whose
mother and extended family are originally from SSBV, offered logistical support and
advice on experimental implementation and participant recruitment, and delivered all
questionnaires (while Cohen organized counterbalancing of questionnaires and noted
responses and feedback). Two additional ‘‘Boa Vistense’’ locals (a female primary
school teacher and a male assistant within the local government assembly offices)
assisted with contacts and general local knowledge.
SSBV covers an area of 1,632 km2 and has a population of 20,500 (Instituto Brasileiro
de Geografia e Estatistı́ca). There are three main towns, of which the municipal seat, also
called São Sebastião da Boa Vista (abbrev. Boa Vista), is the largest. Research was mainly
conducted in this town (population approximately 7,000). The town’s main access from the
state capital of Belém (118 km) is via an overnight ferry or barge due southwest through the
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Baı́a do Guajará, and along the Pará River, which borders the south side of the island.
People live along the banks of the Pará River and its tributaries. Most households own or
have ready access to some form of river transport, from dug-out canoes to fishing vessels of
various sizes. In Boa Vista, the main strip of asphalted road surface doubles as a runway,
which is used by air-ambulances as well as aircraft transporting politicians and other
dignatories to and from the town.
Local subsistence-economic activities mainly include fishing and agro-extraction (mainly
wood, bananas, açaı́, palm, sugarcane, and beans). Livestock include pigs, hens, and a small
number of cattle. Boa Vista is home to a palm heart processing plant, and it is at the heart of
Brazil’s açaı́ region. Services include a post office, schools, food market, clothing retailers,
and a hardware store. The rising appeal of açaı́ products internationally has accelerated
economic growth in the region. Marajó is one of the poorest regions of Pará state, however,
contributing only 3% of the state GDP. According to the 2001 census, over half of the popu-
lation of SSBV was under 18 years of age, and 82.7% of the population was under 40 years;
16.6% of the population over 10 years of age had minimal or no schooling, and 46% had
obtained some primary school education or higher. The largest single group had 1–3 years
of formal schooling.
There are no reliable census data on religious affiliation. Two main churches in Boa
Vista—one Catholic and one Protestant—were attended by a small subsection of the popula-
tion. Ethnographic research, entailing informal conversation and interview with a broad sec-
tion of the population and observation of church activities and attendance, suggests that, for
the majority of our participants, formal religion was relatively unimportant in everyday life.
Conversations on the subject tended to focus on local versions of widespread legends
(lendas) and spirit-related religious practices (e.g., healing, possession, etc.). Although
many explicitly expressed disbelief in such stories (e.g., of river dolphins, or botos, turning
into charming men and seducing menstruating women), others were clearly influenced by at
least the possibility of their truth (e.g., some women refrained from bathing in the river
while menstruating). Government health provision of modern biomedical treatments has
improved via the employment of community ‘‘health agents.’’ Healing traditions derived
from shamanistic curing practices, or cura, are still common in the prevention and treatment
of illness.2
Although local religious traditions suggest the presence of some form of person-body
dualism (e.g., in concepts of spirit possession, soul flight, afterlife, etc.), it is possible
that, following the claims of many anthropologists, this apparent dualism might be held
reflectively as a wholly culturally transmitted principle and therefore would potentially
be very different to Western forms, or confined to a narrow cultural domain that is of
limited relevance to, or difficult to generalize to, the present study’s novel scenario and
questions. Alternatively, consistent and similar judgements across the populations
that certain capacities could survive such a hypothetical disembodiment could poten-
tially support the claim that the ability to reason in terms of person-body autonomy is,
under certain conditions, present beyond the West, and the conceptual outputs of such
reasoning are not wholly culturally transmitted (or a specifically Cartesian or Platonic
legacy).
8 E. Cohen et al. ⁄Cognitive Science (2011)
3. Methods
3.1. Participants
In the UK, 147 people (97 women and 50 men) participated, mean age = 36, range,
12–82 years. Random assignment to condition yielded 51 participants in the Disembodied
Condition (mean age, 39), 48 in the Rock Condition (mean age, 34), and 48 in the Plant
Condition (mean age, 37). Participants were recruited in an Oxford café. All participants
received monetary compensation for time costs incurred (a 5 GBP coffee voucher, approx.
US$8). In Brazil, a total of 154 participants were recruited through word of mouth and
face-to-face invitations (78 women and 76 men; mean age, 31; range, 14–78). There were
54 participants in the Disembodied Condition (mean age, 31), 49 in the Rock Condition
(mean age, 32), and 51 in the Plant Condition (mean age, 30). All participants received
monetary compensation of 5 BRL (approx. US$3).
3.2. Design and procedure
The following brief framing narrative preceded a 51-item questionnaire (condition-
relevant amendments indicated in parentheses):
I want you to imagine that you leave your body [C1](and that you go into a rock
[C2] ⁄plant [C3]). You are not dead, but you have simply left your body (and gone into a
rock [C2] ⁄plant [C3]). Now, this might seem like a strange situation. But I want you to
imagine that you can still exist once you have left your body. The questions that follow
are about you, now that you have left your body (and are in a rock [C2] ⁄plant [C3]).
The same series of questions, in counterbalanced order, were posed across all conditions.
Questions followed the format, ‘‘Do you think that you can still do ⁄ feel, etc. X?’’ The 51
capacities included were as follows: want things, feel hungry, feel achy or sore, feel sexual
desire, remember things, smell things, feel the wetness of the rain, imagine things, feel
angry, feel thirsty, feel relaxed, hear things, feel excited, feel things touching you,
feel scared, feel dirty (grubby), love things, feel faint, learn things, feel cold, feel lonely, feel
dizzy, hate things, feel the blowing of the wind, feel surprised, feel sleepy, feel queasy,
understand things, feel itchy, feel brave, feel upset, feel bloated, see things, feel pleased,
watch things, feel hot, feel calm, feel the sun warming you, feel disgust, know things, feel
happy, feel feverish, believe things, feel like going to the toilet, desire things, taste things,
feel sad, have intentions, hope for things, listen to things, feel out of breath.3
Participants indicated their responses on a 6-point scale with anchors at each end indicat-
ing ‘‘definitely no’’ and ‘‘definitely yes.’’ Each intermediate point was marked by a vertical
line. UK participants read the questionnaire and marked responses on scales adjacent to each
question.
In Brazil, the questionnaire, prepared via translation–backtranslation by bilingual
English–Portuguese speakers who had lived in both Oxford and Belém, was delivered orally
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by a local first-language Brazilian Portuguese speaker. The research setting varied according
to conditions (weather, noise disturbances from music or construction work on boats and
piers, etc.) but tended to be a shaded outdoor or sheltered space with somewhere to sit out
of earshot of passersby. The framing narrative was relayed to participants twice and any
immediate requests for repetition ⁄clarification addressed. The experimenter explained to
each participant that she would ask a series of questions based on the imagined situation. An
enlarged printed and laminated image of the scale was used and participants pointed to it to
indicate their answers. The experimenter explained how the scale worked, drawing attention
to the anchors at each end (e.g., ‘‘If your response is ‘Definitely Yes,’ point here’’) and the
significance of the points in between (e.g., ‘‘If your response is ‘No,’ but not quite
‘Definitely No,’ you can point here’’). Participants indicated no difficulty understanding the
instructions or using the scale during the exercise. Participants were given further opportu-
nity to ask questions about the framing. Queries tended to be rhetorical and merely elicit
repetition of the instructions; ‘‘So, I just have to imagine’’; ‘‘I’ve left my body’’; ‘‘I’m not
dead,’’ etc. Following clarification, the experimenter confirmed whether the participant had
understood and imagined the situation and asked if she could continue with a series of ques-
tions referring to the imagined situation. Participants responded swiftly and without hesita-
tion to the questions. Each interview lasted approximately 10–12 min (4–5 min for
instruction, 5–7 min for experimental questions and responses). Data from one male partici-
pant were excluded from analysis on grounds of alcohol intoxication.
General conversation and any spontaneous feedback on the exercise were reserved for
the end of the session. Participants appeared to enjoy the exercise and, most important, their
feedback indicated that they had imagined the situation as intended—some talked about
how they imagined leaving their body and going into a sunflower, or being in a large rock,
or going about ‘‘taking a turn’’ (dando uma volta) without their body, etc. People commonly
seemed somewhat bemused as to why we might be interested in their answers to such
questions and were curious to know what it was all about. The very low frequency with
which participants drew a link to any potentially relevant cultural references suggests that
framing narrative and questions were indeed novel and that reflective, elaborate cultural
beliefs were unlikely drawn upon to inform responses.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Part 1: Cross-cultural and cross-condition comparisons
No sex differences were detected in mean responses for the 51 items by sample and con-
dition or in any further analyses reported, nor were any question-order effects detected.
We first analyzed responses from the Disembodied Condition, observing whether partici-
pants appeared to differentiate among items. The spread of mean responses showed this to
be the case—in both samples, mean responses were sufficiently varied and spread over a
sufficiently large range as to suggest that items were reasoned about differently (UK range,
2.26–5.24, interquartile range, 3.09–4.77; Brazil range, 2.39–5.44, interquartile range,
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3.21–4.77). One-sample t-tests revealed that 43 (UK) and 27 (Brazil) of the 51 items signifi-
cantly deviated from the scale’s midpoint (3.5).
To examine the agreement between the two samples’ mean rankings of items, we
conducted a Spearman’s rank correlation, confirming a significant positive correlation
(Spearman’s r = .861, p < .001, two-tailed).
Next, we analyzed the effect of condition (Disembodied, Rock, Plant) on responses. For
each sample separately, we collapsed all items that received a continuity score significantly
greater than 3.5 in the Disembodied Condition into a single category (Body Independent)
and combined all other items into a second category (Body Dependent). The Body Indepen-
dent and Body Dependent categories for the UK sample contained 30 and 21 items, respec-
tively, and for the Brazil sample, 22 and 29 items, respectively—see Table 1 for details.
All 22 items items in the Brazil Body Independent category were matched in the corre-
sponding category for the UK. The eight non-matching items (i.e., in the UK Body Indepen-
dent category but the Brazil Body Dependent category) were feel sexual desire, feel angry,
feel excited, feel scared, hate things, feel upset, feel disgust, feel sad.
A 2 (sample) by 3 (condition) anova for the mean continuity scores of the Body Depen-
dent category revealed significant main effects of condition and sample (Condition: F(2,
295) = 7.823, p < .001; Sample: F(1, 295) = 18.309, p < .001). In the UK sample, pairwise
comparisons (LSD corrected) showed a significantly higher mean response in the Plant
Condition (3.48, SD = 0.90) compared with the Disembodied Condition (2.87, SD = 1.06;
p = .009). This result was replicated in the Brazil sample (Plant: 3.86, SD = 1.18, Disem-
bodied: 3.30, SD = 1.26; p = .012), where there was also a significant difference between
the Disembodied and the Rock Conditions (Rock: 4.02, SD = 1.31, p = .002). Compared
with the mean response in the Rock Condition in the UK sample (3.14, SD = 1.09), the
mean response for Rock in the Brazil sample was significantly greater (p < .001).
These results indicate that, whereas in the Brazil sample the introduction of physicality in
the Rock Condition raises the mean of the Body Dependent category significantly, in the
UK sample, mean scores increase significantly only when physicality and biology are
combined.
A further 2 · 3 anova compared responses across samples and conditions for the Body
Independent category, revealing main effects of condition (F[2, 295] = 9.559, p < .001) and
sample (F[1, 295] = 19.601, p < .001), and a significant condition-by-sample interaction
effect (F[2, 295] = 5.231, p = .006). Pairwise comparisons revealed no significant differ-
ences across conditions for the Brazil sample (Disembodied: 4.86, SD = 1.13, Rock: 5.11,
SD = .81, Plant: 4.85, SD = 0.80). In the UK sample, the mean response for Plant (3.89,
SD = 1.08) was significantly less than that of Disembodied (4.73, SD = 0.90) and Rock
(4.76, SD = 0.85) and than that of the Plant condition in the Brazil sample (all p < .001; see
Fig. 1).
These results suggest that, when asked to imagine leaving their bodies, and to reason
about what they would still feel, perceive, know, and so on, participants in both samples
could readily imagine the continuity of some capacities and the cessation of others. Such a
task did not bewilder participants such that they resorted to uniform or random responding
or idiosyncratic heuristics. Participants in both samples judged some capacities to be less
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Table 1
Mean scores and standard deviations for all items in the Disembodied condition
UK Mean (SD) Brazil Mean (SD)
Remember things 5.24 (0.96) Hope for things 5.44 (1.46)
Watch things 5.19 (1.03) Learn things 5.44 (1.49)
See things 5.14 (1.21) See things 5.31 (1.70)
Imagine things 5.11 (1.11) Know things 5.24 (1.69)
Know things 5.06 (1.06) Feel brave 5.22 (1.72)
Love things 5.06 (1.09) Feel happy 5.13 (1.87)
Understand things 4.98 (1.28) Believe things 5.07 (1.96)
Hear things 4.89 (1.23) Desire things 5.04 (1.92)
Want things 4.89 (1.22) Understand things 4.98 (1.96)
Feel happy 4.88 (1.00) Want things 4.94 (1.96)
Believe things 4.82 (1.13) Listen to things 4.91 (2.03)
Feel pleased 4.79 (1.250 Feel Calm 4.81 (2.09)
Listen to things 4.77 (1.33) Remember things 4.80 (2.10)
Hope for things 4.77 (1.34) Watch things 4.76 (2.15)
Feel lonely 4.76 (1.38) Feel surprised 4.72 (2.14)
Feel brave 4.75 (1.21) Imagine things 4.70 (2.14)
Learn things 4.70 (1.48) Love things 4.57 (2.20)
Feel calm 4.70 (1.31) Hear things 4.54 (2.25)
Feel sad 4.69 (1.25) Have intentions 4.46 (2.23)
Feel relaxed 4.66 (1.30) Feel relaxed 4.41 (2.31)
Feel upset 4.65 (1.37) Feel lonely 4.35 (2.32)
Desire things 4.58 (1.36) Feel pleased 4.15 (2.33)
Have intentions 4.57 (1.32) Feel the wind 4.02 (2.35)
Feel angry 4.54 (1.52) Feel upset 4.00 (2.36)
Feel surprised 4.51 (1.38) Feel sad 3.89 (2.42)
Feel excited 4.39 (1.51) Feel sexual desire 3.81 (2.45)
Hate things 4.32 (1.59) Feel the sun 3.80 (2.41)
Feel sexual desire 4.13 (1.63) Feel hot 3.74 (2.43)
Feel scared 4.13 (1.57) Feel sleepy 3.74 (2.46)
Feel disgust 4.11 (1.48) Smell things 3.70 (2.44)
Smell things 3.63 (1.69) Feel cold 3.63 (2.48)
Feel sleepy 3.51 (1.77) Hate things 3.59 (2.41)
Feel the sun 3.40 (1.67) Feel thirsty 3.59 (2.49)
Feel the wetness of the rain 3.18 (1.84) Feel touch 3.56 (2.45)
Feel the wind 3.12 (1.66) Feel faint 3.43 (2.46)
Feel cold 3.11 (1.60) Feel the wetness of the rain 3.30 (2.40)
Feel hot 3.10 (1.54) Feel dizzy 3.24 (2.41)
Taste things 3.09 (1.56) Taste things 3.22 (2.44)
Feel dizzy 3.09 (1.59) Feel angry 3.20 (2.44)
Feel thirsty 3.04 (1.59) Feel excited 3.20 (2.47)
Feel touch 2.93 (1.58) Feel the need to go to the toilet 3.20 (2.41)
Feel dirty 2.73 (1.46) Feel hungry 3.15 (2.44)
Feel hungry 2.64 (1.56) Feel out of breath 3.06 (2.39)
Feel faint 2.58 (1.50) Feel scared 3.04 (2.48)
Feel achy ⁄ sore 2.57 (1.36) Feel achy ⁄ sore 3.00 (2.41)
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likely to continue than others, suggesting that they considered some capacities to be more
strongly anchored to bodily function than others. Further, there was significant intersample
agreement in the items receiving discontinuity and continuity judgements.
Note, however, that although participants judged some capacities to be strongly body
independent and some to be strongly body dependent, several items elicited weak continuity
and weak discontinuity scores. This suggests that certain capacities are perceived not to be
primarily dependent on either person or body, but rather they are thought to be dependent to
some (perhaps differing) degree on both. Alternatively, for some capacities, participants
may have had very weak or widely divergent intuitions resulting in these middling scores.
In either case, we suggest that the ease with which people reason about the autonomy of
body and mind is likely capacity-contingent and context-dependent rather than an inevitable
Table 1
Continued
UK Mean (SD) Brazil Mean (SD)
Feel queasy 2.55 (1.32) Feel disgust 2.98 (2.45)
Feel feverish 2.51 (1.42) Feel itchy 2.72 (2.31)
Feel bloated 2.40 (1.40) Feel queasy 2.56 (2.25)
Feel itchy 2.39 (1.33) Feel bloated 2.46 (2.13)
Feel the need to go to the toilet 2.28 (1.46) Feel feverish 2.46 (2.24)
Feel the sun 2.26 (1.28) Feel dirty 2.39 (2.26)
Note: Items are organized by category and sample (in order of descending mean score). Body Independent
items (i.e., items with a mean score significantly greater than 3.5) are shown in regular font; Body Dependent
items (all other items) are shown in italics.
Fig. 1. Mean continuity scores for Body Dependent and Body Independent items by condition and sample.
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default across the board. The radical unbuckling of perceived mental and bodily contri-
butions to a capacity’s continuity may, under certain conditions, meet with conceptual
difficulty.
The results further showed interesting cross-condition and cross-cultural differences. For
cross-condition analyses, we separated Body Independent items (those receiving a mean
score significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale, or 3.5, in the Disembodied
Condition) from Body Dependent items (all remaining items). In both samples, Body
Dependent items obtained higher mean scores in the Rock and Plant Conditions than in the
Disembodied Condition. That is, capacities were regarded as more likely to continue when
some kind of body was available than if there were none at all. In Brazil, specifically when
participants reasoned about leaving their body and going into a rock, mean scores for Body
Dependent items rose significantly. Adding the property of biology (in the Plant Condition)
had no effect on these items. For UK participants, however, adding physicality raised scores
for the Body Dependent category, but this category only achieved a significantly higher
mean response when biology was further introduced.
This trend in UK responses is in line with the prediction that both physicality and biology
are important in reasoning about bodily function and, by extension, interactions between
bodily and mental functions. Human bodies are not just solid objects that obey principles of
cohesion, solidity, gravity, and so on. By preschool age, children show an understanding of
bodies as animate biological entities that possess parts that relate to movement and bio-
logical function, such as growth and illness (e.g., Hatano & Inagaki, 1994). This role for
biological function is apparent in the response patterns pertaining to the UK population in
the present study. It is unclear why responses in the Brazil sample did not display a similar
pattern. It appears that Body Dependent capacities were perceived to be dependent largely
on physical properties. This would explain why there was a significant jump in mean
response for the Body Dependent category between the Disembodied and Rock Conditions,
but no further rise between the Rock and the Plant Conditions. The results suggest that
although the samples were broadly in agreement regarding which capacities are more
and less dependent upon the body, they differed on whether exclusively physical or
physical-plus-biological function mattered for continuity. Follow-up research is required to
investigate this possibility, and to identify whether indeed there are other psychological
capacities, states, or aptitudes that were not included in the present questionnaire that the
Brazilian population may perceive to have a significant biological dimension. Subsequent
ethnographic research in Marajó (by Cohen), involving in-depth conversation with a range
of people (of different ages and occupations, including fishermen, farmers, teachers, and
housewives) on the biological and physical qualities of rocks and plants, and of a range of
items from the original questionnaire, and on the possible existence of any relevant local
legend or cultural belief about rocks, plants, and so on, have yielded no data relevant to
explaining the cross-cultural differences (see below for further discussion).
Cross-condition comparisons of the Body Independent category of items revealed an
intriguing result. While there were no differences across the three conditions in the Brazilian
sample, the mean continuity response for the Body Independent category fell significantly
in the Plant Condition in the UK sample. Although the mean score was still significantly
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greater than the midpoint of the scale (one-sample t-test: M = 3.89, SD = 1.08,
t(47) = 2.501, p = .016) and therefore still well within the continuity range of the scale, the
cross-condition comparison suggests a significant role for biological function in the
perceived continuity of items that were judged to be strongly continuous in the Disembodied
Condition. The reason for this response pattern is not clear, but one possible interpretation
(discussed in more detail below) is that when certain aspects of biology are made salient to
the UK population, they are also readily perceived as relevant to the functioning of certain
capacities. Limited to the biology of a plant, these properties are judged to be inadequate to
support specifically full-blown human psychological capacities. In effect, it appears that UK
participants were more willing to grant continuity for strongly mental capacities to an
entirely disembodied person than to a person with some biological properties.
This finding raises a number of interesting possibilities that merit follow-up attention.
Our starting point concerns the basic question of how people represent disembodiment, for
example, of self, other, ancestors, spirits, etc. Are spirits, for example, actually thought of as
embodied? It may be that people can readily reflect upon the possibility of leaving the body,
or of spirits as lacking bodies, but there is no research to date directly addressing the
question of whether tacit representations of these entities tend to entail at least some implicit
expectations concerning spatiality (e.g., do they occupy spatial form? do they cohere? etc.),
physicality, and biology. Ethnographic evidence may be suggestive in this regard—ideas
about disembodied entities who wage physical wars, get hungry, feel lonely and isolated,
move in or out of earshot, and so on are far from uncommon.
A cross-condition comparison of the single item ‘‘to see things’’ is potentially informa-
tive also. This capacity ranked highly in the Disembodied Condition in both samples
(achieving second and third mean rank in UK and Brazil, respectively). Mean scores for this
item differed significantly across the conditions, however (Kruskal–Wallis H; UK:
v2 = 18.173, df = 2, p < .001; Brazil: v2 = 7.564, df = 2, p = .023).4 One interpretation
suggested by these results is that the disembodied person’s absence of eyes and relevant
biological mechanisms is not considered unless more specific attention is drawn to this fact.
In the disembodied condition, the generic notion of an absent body appears not to activate
the more specific consideration that the disembodied person now lacks visual perception
mechanisms. When this absence is not made salient, seeing is perceived by participants as
something they do, not their body. However, when the absence (in a rock or plant) of visual
mechanisms is made more directly evident, participants incorporate this consideration into
their continuity judgements.
Of course, in the Brazil sample, the mean response for the Body Independent category as
a whole did not display comparable sensitivity to the introduction of biological properties
and we must therefore be careful not to generalize the import of this finding or interpreta-
tion. Nevertheless, we suggest that in the Plant Condition, biological properties were made
salient to the UK participants, and these properties were then readily judged as significantly
influencing the likely continuity of certain psychological capacities for which specifically
plant biology was perceived to be inadequate. This was the case not only for seeing, as
demonstrated above, but for the Body Independent category as a whole. Simultaneously,
compared with the sample in the Disembodied Condition, this sample judged items in the
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Body Dependent category to be more likely to continue. In the Brazilian sample, in contrast,
although aspects of biological function were made salient in exactly the same way, they
were not perceived to be relevant to continuity judgements for either the Body Dependent
or Body Independent items. We propose that the apparent link from salience to relevance
displayed for Body Independent items in the UK-Plant Condition suggests that the UK
population more readily reasoned in terms of the dependency between biological and
psychological domains than the Brazil population. This interpretation runs contrary to
received wisdom that, in the context of world cultures, Western populations are uniquely
and persistently resistant to reasoning about mental and bodily phenomena as mutually
dependent. Indeed, the results suggest that the Brazilian population was comparatively less
sensitive to the possibility of cross-domain interdependencies, and therefore, in the context
of the current study, tended to reason more dualistically.
4.2. Part 2: Validation of variegated state categories
Recent research into children’s developing reasoning about afterlife reports resistance to
reasoning about the mental states of dead agents as discontinuous. Variegated mental state
categories (e.g., psychobiological, perceptual, epistemic, etc.) have been used to explore the
nature of this resistance. Although criteria for the establishment of categories have never
been explicitly itemized, the degree to which states are perceived to be anchored to bio-
logical function seems to be of particular importance (see Bering & Bjorklund, 2004,
pp. 228–230). The validity of these categories has never been tested, however. Does conti-
nuity on one item of each category predict continuity of other items in the category or do
participants regard some members of each category as continuous and others as discontinu-
ous? To test the hypothesis that the items in each category were ranked similarly in terms of
their anchoring to bodily function, we conducted Friedman tests for each of the categories
from Bering & Bjorklund, 2002 and Astuti & Harris, 2008 for which we had sufficient data
(i.e., on three or more items from the category). Data from the Disembodied condition only
were analyzed. Results are reported in Table 2.
These analyses revealed significant within-category differences across all categories
except for Epistemic in the Brazil sample, suggesting that intracategory items are not
reasoned about similarly in terms of their perceived dependency upon biological function.
We suggest two revised categories of mental states based on mean rankings and intersam-
ple agreement in the current study: (a) Body Independent: see, hope, know, learn, feel
happy, understand; (b) Body Dependent: feel bloated, feel queasy, feel dirty, feel itchy, feel
feverish, feel achy ⁄ sore.
Categories were established by averaging mean rankings (standardized to a 0-1 scale) for
each item across the two samples (data from the Disembodied condition only). All those
items for which the intersample difference between rankings was greater than the average
intersample difference (0.15) were eliminated. The top six ranking items remaining were
selected for inclusion in the Body Independent category and the bottom six were selected
for inclusion in the Body Dependent category. Friedman test results and suggestively strong
Cronbach’s alphas per sample for each category are presented in Table 3. Follow-up
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research with larger sample sizes would enable further exploratory factor analysis across all
items for the identification of finer-grained categorical dimensions.
These findings do not necessarily invalidate the interesting intercategory differences
detected in previous studies, but rather suggest that more accurate categories, supported by
relevant data rather than developed according to a priori assumptions of the experimenter,
might yield more meaningful results. For example, our findings suggest that it is inappropri-
ate to jointly analyze reasoning about the post-death continuity of the capacities to see, hear,
and feel hungry (as in the Astuti & Harris Psychobiological category). Whereas seeing and
hearing both achieved mean scores that placed them in the Body Independent category, feel-
ing hungry obtained a mean discontinuity score in both samples, placing it in the Body
Dependent category. Our results suggest that combining ‘‘seeing’’ and ‘‘hearing’’ with, for
example, ‘‘knowing’’ and ‘‘remembering’’ may have generated more meaningful results.
5. Conclusion
The findings of this study contribute to debates within and between cognitive psychology
and sociocultural anthropology on the cognitive foundations and patterns of cross-cultural
Table 3
Friedman test statistics and Cronbach’s alpha for Body Independent and Body Dependent categories
UK Brazil
n; mean
(SD) v2 df p
Cronbach’s
alpha n; mean (SD) v2 df p
Cronbach’s
alpha
Body Independent 48; 4.92 (1.23) 7.64 5 .177 .87 54; 5.26 (1.7) 4.09 5 .537 .73
Body Dependent 48; 2.53 (1.38) 7.54 5 .184 .87 54; 2.6 (2.27) 4.64 5 .461 .72
Table 2
Friedman test statistics and Cronbach’s alpha for variegated state categories from Bering and Bjorklund (2002)
and Astuti and Harris (2008)a
UK Brazil
n; mean (SD) v2 df p n; mean (SD) v2 df p
Bering & Bjorklund (2002)
Psychobiological1 49; 2.93 (1.56) 12.64 3 .005 54; 3.26 (2.41) 10.93 3 .012
Perceptual2 50; 4.19 (1.42) 56.61 3 <.001 54; 4.19 (2.16) 36.69 3 <.001
Emotional3 49; 4.60 (1.36) 16.53 3 <.001 54; 3.67 (2.39) 16.50 3 .001
Epistemic4 50; 5.04 (0.76) 7.62 2 .022 54; 5.05 (1.92) 1.30 2 .521
Astuti and Harris (2008)
Mental5 50; 4.34 (1.27) 128.64 5 <.001 54; 4.44 (2.11) 56.41 5 <.001
Psychobiological6 50; 4.22 (1.33) 64.09 2 <.001 54; 4.33 (2.13) 30.77 2 <.001
aItems included from present dataset: 1queasy, hungry, thirsty, sleepy; 2taste, hear, smell, see; 3scared, angry,
sad, love; 4 believe, know, remember; 5hungry, cold, know, hear, see, remember; 6see, hear, hungry.
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recurrence and variation in mind-body thinking. The results suggest broad intersample
agreement on which capacities, aptitudes, feelings, etc. participants judged to be
dependent ⁄ independent on bodily function. The apparent facility to reason in terms of
the autonomy of mental and biological function is not peculiar to Western populations, and
there are significant cross-cultural parallels across the two samples with regard to where the
line between ‘‘you’’ and ‘‘body’’ lies. There appears to be some divergence, however,
concerning the roles of biological and physical properties in these assessments. Specifically,
the Brazilian Amazonian population accorded considerable influence to physicality, but not
biology, for items judged to be Body Dependent. UK participants judged both physicality
and biology to importantly influence Body Dependent items and Body Independent items.
While we do not argue that our data support the position that person-body dualism is an
intuitive default stance on the social world, we have presented findings that suggest that
intuitions underpinning psycho-physical-biological reasoning for everyday traits, capacities,
and feelings assume a broadly similar form cross-culturally. The cross-cultural similarities
identified provide support for the view that the dualistic categories we term ‘‘person’’ and
‘‘body’’ may not be wholly culturally transmitted and are certainly not confined to the West.
Although it is possible that the convergence in reasoning patterns is due to cultural factors
largely independent of the conceptual constraints that characterize basic causal cognition, a
more likely explanation, in the absence of any obvious reflective cultural beliefs and
traditions that could inform responses to the full range of specific questions pertaining to
this novel scenario, is that reasoning is informed and constrained by cognitive mechanisms
that develop in broadly similar ways cross-culturally to deal with broadly similar social,
biological, and physical worlds.
A rich empirical literature on the origins of intuitive causal reasoning about psychologi-
cal, physical, and biological phenomena has demonstrated the early emergence of founda-
tional causal cognition in these core areas. In the first year of life, for example, infants have
a basic grasp of the principles of physical causation relevant to bounded physical objects,
correctly expecting that objects move as cohesive wholes with spatiotemporal continuity,
that they are subject to the laws of gravity, that they must be contacted to be launched, and
that they cannot pass through other solid objects (Baillargeon, 1995; Spelke, 1994; Spelke,
Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; Spelke, Philips, & Woodward, 1995). A wealth
of evidence suggests that infants distinguish intentional agents from other kinds of physical
entities on the basis of several cues, such as motion patterns (e.g., self-propelled vs. contact-
caused motion), morphological features (e.g., presence vs. absence of eyes), patterns of
interaction (e.g., contingent vs. noncontingent responsiveness), and purposeful action (e.g.,
presence vs. absence of goal-directedness) (e.g., Bloom, 2004; Murray & Trevarthen, 1985;
Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001; Wynn, 2008) applying different and appropriate expecta-
tions to these entities (Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). Such early-emerging causal cogni-
tion may provide the foundation and scaffolding for further development of intuitive
expectations and acquisition of cultural ideas about finer-grained within-domain and cross-
domain interactions between psychological, psycho-physical, and psychobiological traits
and bodily function. The causal principles that guide inferences, predictions, and expecta-
tions in one domain may be largely irrelevant to, and incommensurate with, the causal
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principles that guide reasoning in another domain. If so, many questions arise concerning
how or whether reasoning becomes intuitively integrated over development or whether
divergent principles are merely loosely juxtaposed under certain contexts, such as when
reflectively assessing cross-domain interations within multi-domain entities (such as
humans), experiences (such as bodily pain), and events (such as brain injury).
The significant differences between the two populations represented in this study further
suggest that some aspects of mind-body reasoning are less constrained by the common
workings of basic cognition and are therefore more susceptible to cultural tuning, for exam-
ple, via exposure to divergent learning environments. The key differences concern (a) the
relative importance of biology and physicality for body-dependent capacities, and (b) the
conditions under which the body is perceived to be causally relevant to mental function.
Specifically, we found that Brazilian participants appeared to be more resistant to the possi-
bility of mind-body interactions than the UK participants. Prior and subsequent ethno-
graphic research has not revealed why this may be the case. Further ethnographic research,
data on children’s developing reasoning about person-body phenomena using an adapted
methodology, and the use of an ethnographically informed range of framing narratives,
incorporating different priming conditions, may help to reveal the causal origins of these
differences. The differences revealed by this preliminary investigation tentatively suggest
that anthropologists may have both overestimated the influence of Descartes in sustaining
mind-body dualism in the West and underestimated the influence of more recent scientific
discoveries and theories in the fields of neurobiology and neuroscience more generally on
thinking about mind-body interdependencies. Where this latter influence is particularly
prevalent (e.g., via science education), conceptual resistance to more integrated, holistic
mind-body reasoning might, under certain conditions, be weakened or overridden.
Further research is required to investigate developmental trajectories of person-body
reasoning cross-culturally, the sources of cross-cultural recurrence and variation, the rela-
tionship between reflective and intuitive causal reasoning about person-body interactions
and interdependencies, and the influence of cognitive and cultural factors in the spread of
relevant concepts and practices. Regarding this final question, for example, we might expect
to observe more frequently in the cross-cultural record concepts of ghosts who can see or
feel happy than ghosts who can smell things, feel itchy, and so on. Future research might
also investigate how cross-domain causal relations are conceptualized, looking specifically
at the relationship between person-body reasoning and attributions of intentionality and
responsibility. What assumptions guide reasoning about intentional control over different
capacities thought to be more and less person-related or body-related? Perhaps the degree to
which a capacity is thought to be Body Dependent correlates with assumptions about the
degree to which it is impervious to mental influence. Based on the results of the present
study, we suggest, for example, that people are more likely to attribute feeling happy to con-
scious control than feeling queasy. The current design did not allow for the inclusion of
items that might be considered strictly bodily (e.g., whether one’s hair still grows, or one’s
legs still work, etc.) as this may have engendered some confusion regarding the ‘‘you’’
being referred to in the question (i.e., the you that has left the body, or the body). Neverthe-
less, we would predict that conscious control is, in turn, more likely to be attributed some
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potential role in whether one feels queasy than in whether one’s hair grows quickly or
slowly. Relatedly, it would be of interest to ascertain whether degree of perceived conscious
control correlates with degree of perceived responsibility. Systematic investigation in this
area would potentially yield findings of importance for mental health education (e.g.,
regarding the biological underpinnings of depression) and professional training (see Miresco
& Kirmayer, 2006).
Finally, we sought to assess the validity of mental state categories established in current
relevant literature on afterlife beliefs, and to develop novel categories for use in future
research on mind-body dualism. The framing narrative of the Disembodied Condition clo-
sely resembles the basic structure of widespread concepts of disembodied agents, character-
istic of religious concepts but also common in popular fiction and film, and children’s
imaginary worlds. For example, concepts of afterlife and ancestor spirits, reincarnation,
spirit possession, soul flight, mind swaps, imaginary companions, and so on, share a com-
mon conceptual commitment to the same radical disconnect between person and body that
we invited participants to imagine. The design of our study therefore allowed us to assess
the validity of mental state categories used in the existing cognitive psychological literature
that are purported to carve up the domain according to the degree to which they are
perceived to be tied to bodily function.
In the UK sample, all categories previously used in the literature failed to cohere, with
one or more items obtaining mean continuity rankings significantly different to one or more
items in the group. In the Brazil sample, only the Bering and Bjorklund Epistemic category
achieved a nonsignificant result (suggesting that items in this category were ranked
similarly by participants in terms of their perceived anchoring to bodily function). We have
presented suggestions for new, validated Body Dependent and Body Independent categories
for future research on person-body reasoning.
In conclusion, the cross-cultural study reported offers the first systematic, cross-cultural
analysis of person-body reasoning across a broad range of capacities, provides firm eviden-
tial grounds for the refinement of theory and method in future cognitive psychological and
anthropological research, and suggests numerous lines of potential further inquiry on the
emergence and spread of patterns of recurrence and variation in mind-body dualism in
particular, and person-body reasoning generally.
Notes
1. BBC News. ‘‘Donor organ ‘personality’ worry.’’ Available at: http: ⁄ ⁄news.bbc.co.
uk ⁄1 ⁄hi ⁄8084936.stm. Accessed June 5, 2009.
2. Rural, non-indigenous Brazilian Amazon communities have received relatively little
attention in the ethnographic literature. Notable contributions to the scarce ethnogra-
phy of these ‘‘people without an official ethno’’ (Nugent, 1993, p. xviii) are Harris,
1998, 2000; Nugent, 1993, 1997; Pace, 1998; Wagley, 1976 [1953].
3. Four further items were included in the questionnaire but subsequently dropped from
analysis due to evidence of comprehension problems with the Portuguese translation
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at the time of administering the questionnaire to the Brazilian sample. The four items
were feel bored, forget things, feel tingly, feel jealous.
4. UK ⁄Brazil mean scores were 5.14 ⁄5.32 (Disembodied), 4.79 ⁄4.92 (Rock), and
3.71 ⁄4.29 (Plant)
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